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By: Disasters are tough, ill-structured problems that occur in complex and changing environments that include multiple and diverse decision-makers and stakeholders, unlimited alternatives, high levels of conflict, and generally unknown outcomes. They pose leadership challenges. I've called this the "When everyone's in charge, no one is in charge and when no one is in charge, no one is in charge" leadership problem. Lost responsibility and lost accountability can result in unimaginable human tragedy. After 9/11 the threat of terrorist on our homeland led to creating a new national structure for dealing with disasters and thrust the national government into a more dominating role in emergency management. But the "intergovernmental paradox of emergency management" is that the "governments least likely to perceive emergency management as a very high priority-local governments-are at center stage in terms of responsibility and are limited in their capacity (financial, managerial, technical) to deal with hazards." The local landscape in the U.S. includes 87,000 local governments that are mostly small, with "volunteer" officials among the 500,000 elected nationwide. More than 650,000 law enforcement officers, 1.1 million firefighters (3/4ths volunteers), and 500,000 emergency medical personnel are first responders, along with citizens caught in the disasters as victims or helpers. The private sector in those communities owns 85% of the infrastructure (e.g., 87,000 food processing plants, 6,000 chemical plants, and 2,500 power plants) and the non-profit community is comprised of tens of thousands of organizations. Nationally, states and the national government have traditionally served facilitating, not dominating, roles in disaster management. In terms of lives and property lost, natural disasters-floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, wildfires, subsidence, earthquakes, etc.-lead to the most losses of lives and property. Since 9/11 we have been struggling to find a balance between the ever present threat of natural disasters yet the need to protect and prepare for domestic terrorism and the likelihood of mass casualties. Katrina reminded that non-terrorist or natural disasters can also have catastrophic impact. And, 9/11 exposed our vulnerabilities to terrorists: over 100,000 miles of coastline; 2,000 miles of border with Mexico and 4,000 with Canada; 500 million people each year going through 420 U.S. aerial ports with more than a million international aircraft entries; 300 land and sea ports through which 127 million autos and 11.5 million trucks enter annually and through which 6 million containers are deposited for redistribution throughout the U.S.; and 127 million autos, 11.5 million trucks , and 2.3 million rail cars crossing into the U.S. annually. Whether an event is natural or human-made, terrorist or non-terrorist-related, is important in shaping the exact response/recovery strategies. But the magnitude of a threat, the vulnerability to communities and to the nation, and/or the consequence of the disaster in terms of lives and property lost or national security should be of the highest concern in shaping the emergency management system. By design and necessity, dealing with emergencies involves complex relations among all levels of government in sharing responsibilities. Cooperation is needed along vertical lines (national-state-local) and along horizontal lines (municipal-municipal, regional). Leadership that builds collaborative relationships in our decentralized governance system is required. We expected a greater role for the national government in the Katrina disaster -- the first test of the December 2004 National Response Plan, which gives the Department of Homeland Security very broad authority to respond to a major disaster through rapid deployment of "key essential resources," including medical teams and supplies, food and water, transportable shelters, and urban search and rescue teams. The NRP refers to catastrophic incidents that result in a large number of casualties and/or displaced persons, possibly in the tens of thousands. It notes that detailed operations might not be possible for at least 24 to 48 hours after an incident and says that that response must begin without complete details or an assessment of critical needs. If there is any core role for the national government, it is to save lives, prevent suffering, and mitigate severe damage, which is what the NPR makes clear DHS can do to move very quickly to compensate for the realities of the "intergovernmental paradox." Terrorist events are usually surprises with precise targets unknown. Katrina and the possibility of topped and breached levees was predicted and New Orleans and the Gulf Coast was the known target. The response could have-should have-would have been earlier and better targeted had we followed our plan and if the national leadership style was "massive common sense." The "intergovernmental paradox" and the "who's in charge" problems discussed here are drawn from Dr. Cigler's published works on those topics. 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